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Toleration has been recently attacked both on practical and on theoretical grounds. On practical
grounds, confronting religious terrorism, many commentators have asked whether toleration can
remain the general policy toward cultural and religious diversity. Theoretically, toleration has been
questioned  as  to  its  analytical  capacity  in  the  realm  of  partisan  politics.  This  paper  aims  at
countering such criticisms, by means of a conceptual clarification especially focused on the notion
of  intolerance,  intolerable  and  response  to  intolerance.  The  controversial  cases  arising  in
contemporary democracy are usually focused on the limits of toleration, hence on the intolerable, by
stretching the interpretation of the self-defense and of the harm principle. The author argues that the
stretching  is  often  excessive  and  the  resulting  interpretations  too  contentious  to  provide  solid
grounds for the intolerable. Alternatively, issues of toleration can be examined from the point of
view of tolerance/intolerance. This viewpoint can clarify issues at the descriptive level, sorting out
who was tolerant and who was intolerant and what was intolerable, while disagreement may persist
at the normative level, according to the favored justification of toleration.
Introductory note
Toleration has recently received multiple attacks from different sources. On the one hand, toleration
seems  defeated  in  practice  by  the  violence  stemming  from religious  fundamentalism,  violence
which calls for security measures of police and intelligence, for toleration is stopped in front of the
intolerant.  Confronting  religious  terrorism,  many  Western  commentators  now  wonder  whether
toleration  can  remain  the  general  policy  toward  cultural  and  religious  diversity  and,  more
specifically, toward practices and convictions at odds with liberal and democratic values, among
which most prominent are those coming from Muslim religion. This question seems to suppose that
too much toleration is threatening the cohesion of Western societies, depriving them of adequate
defense against the penetration of religious radicalism, .1
On the other hand, toleration is being questioned theoretically, as a useful analytical and
normative tool in liberal-democratic politics. In a recent work, Glenn Newey affirms that toleration
has been taken hostage by partisan politics  and that  accusations  of intolerance  are circular  and
settled only by political contingency.2 The political decision settling the issue is moreover a
coercive decision, and not a tolerant act.3 Hence, he doubts that toleration can still be, if ever, a
useful theoretical concept, a normative ideal and an analytical category for understanding politics
and social reality, and for providing insights into what to do. In a different fashion, Peter Balint’s
Respecting Toleration, despite the title, outlines an idea of toleration as “live and let live” where its
specificity  is  lost  and toleration  is  conflated  with  negative  liberty.4 Both  authors,  in  their  own
different ways, share the view that normative theories of toleration are of little use to make sense
and to  settle  political  conflicts  over  different  convictions  and  practices.  By means  of  different
arguments,  both  Newey  and  Balint  intend  toleration  as  synonym  of  accommodation  of  value
conflicts, and hold that all the conceptual and normative discussion of when, what, why and how far
toleration is recommended is misplaced. Toleration is a rhetorical instrument in power struggles,
according to Newey, and it is any sort of behavior not violating others’ liberty in Balint’s view. Yet
if  toleration  is  not  specifically  defined and does not  provide guidelines  for social  and political
action, how can one rebut the claim that too much toleration is defeating liberal society in front of
any illiberal invasion?
In this  paper,  I  aim at  rescuing toleration  as  an analytic  and normative  category  and at
showing that  it  can still  provide guidelines  for interpreting social  reality  and orienting political
action.  I  think  that  a  theoretical  restatement  of  toleration  will  help  to  counter  the  claim  for
restricting toleration of cultural practices in response to terrorist violence. I shall not however be
here concerned with this issue, while I shall focus specifically on the theoretical challenge. To this
end, some preliminary conceptual clarifications are necessary. The concept of toleration and the
conceptions which articulate the concept have elicited a lot of theoretical reflection which I am
going briefly to rehearse in the first section of this paper. The specular concept of intolerance is
instead left unexplored as if it were self-evident, being the opposite of toleration. But, in fact, the
alternative to toleration is not just intolerance, but may be a welcoming attitude, indifference, or
acquiescence.  Moreover,  it  is  unclear  which  acts  are  simply  intolerant  or  are  the  responses  to
intolerance or the responses to a trespassing on the boundary of the tolerable. In the second section
of the paper, I am thus going to trace these distinctions that are especially important to sort out
circular claims of intolerance I shall argue that drawing theoretical distinctions between toleration,
intolerance, responses to intolerance and intolerable will help breaking down the vicious circle and
reinstating toleration as an analytical and normative category.. In the third section, I shall make use
of the preceding conceptual analysis of toleration/intolerance/intolerable by examining an especially
complex controversy, where the reciprocal accusations of intolerance seems to confirm Newey's
skeptical view on toleration. The controversy concerns the discussion over freedom of expression
vs.  protection  of religious  sensitivity,  which started in  2005 with the publication of the Danish
cartoons portraying Mohammad and went on until its tragic epilogue with the deadly attack on
Charlie Hebdo.5 I have picked this case for it is a good example of the confusion about who was
intolerant  and of  what,  given the circular  accusations  of intolerance  with reference to  different
objects. It thus represents a good case to test whether toleration is capable to disentangle the knot, as
I contend.
Conceptual Clarification: Conceptions of Toleration
A first clarification concerns the inextricably normative nature of the concept of toleration, which I
am  going  to  illustrate  shortly.  Some  thinkers  have  recently  criticized  the  moralized  view  of
toleration  as  a  useless  theoretical  exercise  and  proposed  a  purely  descriptive  concept  as  an
alternative.6 A moralized view of toleration holds that either or both the objects of toleration and the
reasons for tolerating them are of moral nature so as to grant the moral quality of toleration as a
virtue.7 In this way, toleration turns out too restricted, for it does not include objects of mere dislike
such as cultural  differences,  and carries  an unpleasant  tone of moral  condescension toward the
tolerated.  Nevertheless,  the alternative  to  a  moralized  concept  of toleration  is  not  necessarily  a
purely descriptive account. We need a normative account, which makes sense of toleration as a
valuable thing, and sets it apart from forbearance of what cannot be tolerated, without relying on an
unduly restricted moral view. For, toleration is an ideal and is an undisputed social and political
value in democratic society, though the reasons why it is a value vary and there is no agreement
about that. That toleration is a value is reflected in the fact that no one likes to be called intolerant,
and that is the reason for the reciprocal accusations of intolerance in public discourse, which Newey
refers to. Instead of inferring from such an ideological use that toleration is a form of ideology tout-
court,  I  propose  that  clear  criteria  for  a  proper  use  of  ‘tolerant/intolerant’ should  be  provided,
whereas tolerant is prima facie a commendable attitude and intolerant is not. In other words, I think
that the definition should include the (normative) conditions under which toleration as valuable is
the case, keeping agnostical concerning the reasons why it is a value. Putting up with murder, for
example, is not an instance of toleration. Yet, under a purely descriptive definition, there is no way
to set apart toleration of the hijab, for example, and connivance with crime. Therefore, the definition
of toleration should not only specify what toleration consists in, in terms of attitudes and actions,
but also circumscribe the area within which toleration is a value. For outside that area, the same
kind of attitude and action is no more ‘tolerant’ in the proper sense I want to defend here, but just
‘permissive’ and more precisely culpably indulgent. If we do not want to equate toleration with
permissiveness or forbearance in general, then the limits for toleration to be a value are constitutive
of the concept, which has a descriptive content but which is also inherently normative, though not
moralized for neither the objects nor the reasons of toleration need to be of moral nature, as it will
become clear in the following analysis. I hold that the confusion surrounding the discourse over
toleration will be greatly diminished with the adoption of a normative definition of the concept of
toleration.
Toleration is a concept articulated in different conceptions and theories. While there is an
ongoing debate about which conception is the most suitable for addressing certain issues, there is
basic agreement on the concept of toleration,8 despite the fact that it is spelled out differently by
different authors.9 Briefly, the core features of the concept of toleration are: 1) agent a’s dislike of
agent  b's views, codes, or convictions. 2)  a’s  wielding of some power of interference with the
difference in question. 3) a’s withholding of such power in favor of leaving b free to live by and
pursue her ideals, 4)  within the limits of self-defense and of harming others. Toleration, as a
relevant social and political category, applies in a context of religious, moral and cultural pluralism
where  social  differences  do  not  harmoniously  combine  and social  groups  disagree  about  what
counts in life and how one should live. There is no toleration if there is no original dislike, be it
moral disapproval or non-moral objection, and if such dislike is not eventually overcome in favor of
non-interference,  despite  the  possibility  of  intervention.  Yet,  overcoming  one’s  dislike  and  not
acting out of it can be said ‘tolerant’ only within the limits fixed by the principle of self-defense and
of harm to third party.
The different conceptions of toleration then organize these core features according to two
criteria. The first criterion pertains to the reasons justifying toleration, which can vary from modus
vivendi  to  equal  liberty,  and  equal  respect.10 The  second  concerns  whether  toleration  applies
horizontally,  among  individuals  and  groups,  or  vertically,  directed  by  the  state  or  political
institutions  at  certain  groups  of  citizens.  While  the  concept  of  toleration  specifies  the  general
features that any instantiation should have in order to be recognized as toleration, set apart from
indifference,  acquiescence  and  culpable  indulgence,  the  conceptions  of  toleration  specify  why
toleration  is  a  value,  for  what  reasons,  and in  what  setting.  I  am now going to  consider  three
conceptions of toleration which are especially relevant in contemporary debates and specifically for
the  purpose  of  this  paper,  namely:  1)  the  social  virtue  of  toleration;  2)  the  liberal  model  of
toleration; 3) toleration as recognition.11
The conception of toleration as a social virtue articulates the core concept in the horizontal
relationship of two social parties, one of which objects to the other’s conduct (or convictions, or
lifestyle),  but  withholds  the  possibility  of  interfering,  choosing  to  tolerate  the  disapproved  or
disliked conduct. The reasons why the tolerator decides to withhold his power of interference, then,
characterize the social virtue of toleration either as negative, if based on instrumental and pragmatic
reasons, or positive, if backed by moral considerations.  12The social virtue thus bifurcates in two
further conceptions according to the type of justification for toleration.
While toleration as a social virtue applies horizontally, the liberal conception of toleration is
vertical and addresses the relationship between the political authority and citizens. The move from
the horizontal to the vertical dimension changes the structure of the problem: it still originates in the
dislikes among different social parties, but, in this case, the decision to intervene or tolerate the
object of dislike resides with the political authority, which has the monopoly of coercion. Hence, a
horizontal  dislike  between  two  social  parties  gives  rise  to  a  vertical  decision  for  or  against
toleration. In this way the parties involved are at least three: the objecting party, the objected party
and the political authority which will settle the question in favor or against toleration.
Within  liberalism,  the  principle  of  political  toleration  recommending  political  non-
interference with religious and moral convictions of people, if there is no disruption for law and
order,  is  generalized  in  equal  liberty  rights.  Accordingly,  liberal  toleration  is  embodied  in  the
principle  of  liberal  neutrality.13 The  ideal  of  neutrality  addresses  disagreement  and dislike  over
religious, moral and cultural difference by granting equal liberty to all, without judging the content
of the dispute, as long as the harm principle is not violated.14 Neutral political institutions do not
adopt attitudes of dislike or disapproval of any views, but provide conditions for their  peaceful
coexistence.15 The state thus requires toleration of its citizens in their reciprocal relations, that is, it
requires  that  citizens  respect  each  other's  liberty.  The  political  duty  to  tolerate  each  other  is
compatible with either social tolerance or intolerance. In the latter case, intolerance manifests not in
obstructing  other  agents'  liberty  literally,  but  in  using  social  sanctions  of  various  kinds,  which
diminish social freedom and standing.
Lastly, toleration as recognition relates both to the vertical dimension and to the horizontal
dimension,  and is  meant  to  supplement  liberal  toleration  in  the  circumstances  of  contemporary
pluralism.16 In contemporary democracy, where liberty rights are enshrined in constitutions, it would
seem that significant questions of toleration were preempted. Yet they still arise, from veil wearing
to places  of worship,  from gay marriage  to religiously dietary restrictions.  These contemporary
issues are special because a) they explicitly concern public toleration and b) they imply a claim to
recognition  of  the  contested  differences.  The  standoff  is  usually  produced  by  social  majorities
demanding that practices perceived as being at odds with the host society's principles and customs
be restricted, contained, and rendered invisible, and symmetrically, by minorities claiming public
toleration  of  their  practices  and  political  protection  against  offenses,  humiliation,  and
discrimination. There is more than equal freedom at stake: there are asymmetries of power deriving
from the social standing of different groups and defining inclusion in, or exclusion from, society,
with significant  political  implications.  The principle  of neutrality  is  not sufficiently  sensitive to
perceive the struggle over exclusion/inclusion underlying issues of toleration. Neutrality does not
see that the public space is not difference-free, but populated by the majority's customs and
conventions, and that difference-blind politics runs the risk of reproducing existing exclusion, for
not all members of society enjoy the same freedom to follow their convictions and lifestyles, and
such asymmetries  in freedom correspond to asymmetries  in inclusion.  Beyond toleration  in the
sense of equal liberty for minorities, here at stake there is the recognition of minority members, with
their different practices and customs, as equal members of the polity worthy of the same respect as
members of the majority. In this sense, it is important that the difference in question not only is not
prohibited, but also receives public toleration, and for the right reasons, meaning the recognition of
its legitimate presence in the public space. Liberal neutrality tends to bracket all social differences
together as equally irrelevant politically, thus obscuring the asymmetries among social differences
and  their  implications  in  terms  of  inclusion  in  the  polity.  Toleration  as  recognition  intends  to
overcome this specific blindness, by making room for all social differences (within the bounds of
the harm principle), while yet reaffirming the principles underlying liberal neutrality, that is non-
perfectionism  and  impartiality.  For  the  public  recognition  of  a  social  difference  implies  its
recognition  as  a  legitimate  option  of  the  pluralist  society.  But  it  does  not  imply  a  substantive
evaluation of that difference as good and worthwhile; liberal institutions must not abdicate from
their  non-judgmental,  non-evaluative,  impartial  stance:  toleration  as  recognition  does  not  imply
taking sides. In this respect, toleration as recognition is neither  permission nor  acceptance, since
liberal institutions are not entitled to forbid or accept, let alone embrace, anything within the bounds
of the law, but legitimization: a public declaration that a given practice, if it does not infringe any
right, is a legitimate option among others. The literal meaning of toleration does not change from
liberal toleration to toleration as recognition, but the symbolic meaning does, for the reasons in
favor of toleration are not negative, but positive. The difference in question is tolerated not because
it does not infringe the harm principle, but because it contributes to fully include the bearers of that
difference.  The  legitimization  of  the  public  presence  of  a  difference  then  brings  along  an
accommodation in the social practices and a revision in social standards so as to make room for the
difference in question and for its bearers.17
To sum up, the three conceptions of toleration supplement  each other,  depending on the
circumstances  of their  application  and the issue at  hand. The social  virtue of toleration applies
horizontally among social agents, and according to the reasons backing the choice for toleration
may mean either “putting up” or “accept out of respect”. This conception however is inadequate as
a  political  principle  because  the  primary  condition  of  dislike  or  disapproval  cannot  apply  to
democratic  authority.  Political  toleration,  either  according to  the  traditional  liberal  model  or  to
toleration as recognition, instead resolves a social conflict engendered by the objection of one social
group toward the difference of another. The two vertical conceptions differ concerning their backing
reasons and their symbolic meaning. Which is the most adequate depends on the issue at
hand: whether it has to do just with equal liberty or whether it has to do with equal respect and
equal standing in the polity as well.
Intolerance and Intolerable
The clarification of what constitutes  an intolerant  act  and what  constitutes  an intolerable act  is
crucial if toleration as analytical and normative category is to be rescued from partisan politics and
media debates. Toleration is a value, both as a virtue and as a political principle, only within limits,
as generally acknowledged, for ‘toleration’ of murder or rape is certainly not a value. Beyond its
limits, toleration turns into culpable indulgence of conducts and practices that are ‘intolerable’. In
the doctrine of toleration, the self-defense of the political and social order, coming from Locke, and
the  harm principle,  coming  from Mill,  represent  the  two,  widely  shared  boundaries  separating
objects for toleration from what is intolerable.18 While the two principles are uncontentious, what
counts as a threat to the social and political order, as well as what counts as harm is a matter of
ongoing controversy.19 , I shall not get into this discussion which usually requires to plunge into
specific contexts. I shall simply assume a bottomline definition of either principle which no one can
reasonably rejects. That is to say, I take that harm is any violation of rights of others, their bodily
integrity,  their liberty and their  property.  Similarly I take that self-defense kicks in when actual
threats to law and order are the case, such as terrorist attacks. The two limits of self-defense and
harm to others qualify acts trespassing on them as ‘intolerable’. Consequently, the response to the
intolerable  should  be  non-toleration  of  those  very  acts.  The  non-toleration  of  murder  or  rape,
however, is not ‘intolerant’, for the prosecution of crime is mandated by the rule of law, and not
ascribed to disapproval or disagreement between social parties. The response to the ‘intolerable’, to
whatever  has infringed the limits  of toleration,  is  therefore not an intolerant  act  even though it
implies the non-toleration of the ‘intolerable’.
What is then intolerance? First, intolerance properly applies to the same domain of objects
for which toleration  is  in  order.  Intolerance  is  to  be detected  within the scope of  what  can be
tolerated, and it is a value to tolerate. It does not apply to what trespasses on the limits of toleration:
thus  one  can  tolerant  or  intolerant  of  vegetarianism,  but  she  cannot  be  said  to  be  tolerant  or
intolerant  of  rape.  Imposing  a  meat-based  menu  in  a  cafeteria  is  an  intolerant  act  towards
vegetarians, while prosecuting rape is the proper response to the intolerable. In this way, we have in
principle drawn a clear line between intolerant acts and proper responses to intolerable acts. This
distinction is important descriptively, but it has also very important political implications. Since in
liberal  democracy,  being  tolerant  is  considered  a  value,  while  being  intolerant  is  generally
disapproved, then agents tend to present their intolerant acts as responses to the intolerable, for in
that case they would be justified and not at all intolerant. Yet, such justification is valid only if the
object in question oversteps the limits of toleration, hence it is justifiably defined as intolerable.
That is why the accusations of intolerance are circular, for each party contests the opponent to have
overstepped the limits of toleration, and that is why the interpretation of self-defense and of the
harm principle have become so inflated that little room is left to toleration. That is also the reason
why I stick to a bottomline definition of harm and threats to social and political order so as to avoid
conflating intolerant acts with responses to the intolerable.
Going back to the definition of intolerance,  what constitutes an intolerant  act  within the
boundaries  of  the  tolerable?  The  answer  is  not  obvious  for  lack  of  toleration  may  depend  on
indifference or acquiescence, and requires going back to the concept of toleration. The core concept
of toleration comprises both an original objection by a social agent with some power of interference
and the suspension of that objection.20
If  there  is  no  original  objection,  there  is  no  case  for  either  toleration  or  intolerance.
Intolerance follows from the original objection. More precisely, intolerance is the case when social
party A, endowed with some power of interference, objects to some difference x of party B and,
instead of suspending the objection in favor of toleration,  chooses to act on that very objection,
even if  x does not infringe the limits  of toleration.21 Attitudes  and behavior  that  are  intolerant,
implying the non-suspension of the original  objection,  can thus be set  apart  from attitudes  and
behavior  that  are  responses  to  intolerance,  that  is,  acts  of  resistance  to  interference  with  one's
convictions and lifestyles  by another  party.  If the KKK, out of its  dislike of non-white people,
organizes a racist demonstration, displaying all the symbols of white supremacy and exercising its
power of intimidation, this is a display of intolerance, of a dislike openly exhibited with the purpose
of intimidating. If African-Americans protest against such a demonstration, which targets them as a
racial  group, their  claim to stop such racist displays is not intolerant,  but, more properly, is the
response to intolerance. Similarly, those who object to the construction of mosques, and pour pig's
blood on the building site, are intolerant,  whereas Muslims protesting against such behavior are
resisting the intolerance directed at them. The line between intolerance and response to intolerance
is thus based: a) on the decision to act on the original objection instead of withholding it, on the one
hand, and on the response to the interference with one's convictions and customs on the other; b) on
the content of the objection, whether it concerns the convictions, way of life, and customs of the
other party, or whether it concerns the rebuttal of the attack on one's own convictions, customs, and
way of life. Resistance to the attack and defense of one's convictions and lifestyle cannot be equated
with intolerance of those who dislike those convictions and lifestyle. For example, the aggressive
display of homophobic  attitudes  is  intolerant  of the sexual  orientation  of gays and lesbians;  in
contrast, the gay pride parade is an affirmation of the legitimacy of homosexual orientation, and not
an attack on the heterosexual lifestyle. .Those who protest against the gay pride in fact claim that
the gay display in the parade harms their convictions and pollutes the moral fabric of society, hence
it is intolerable, Yet if we allow such a stretching of the limits of toleration, the room for personal
liberty of minority groups would be unduly reduced and equal liberty of all would be undermined.
For, heterosexuals would be free not only to follow their sexual orientation, but also to limit the
correlative  freedom,  and  hence  the  public  consideration  of  homosexuals.  Thus  there  are  good
reasons  to  stick  to  the  bottomline  definition  of  the  limits  of  toleration  provided  above.
Summarizing, there seem to be two conditions for intolerance: a) the original and non-suspended
objection; b) the other-regarding nature of the objection. By contrast, the response to intolerance is
characterized by a) being the counter-objection to a previous objection targeting the respondents, b)
being self-regarding.
In sum, when we are confronting acts harming other people or threatening the security of the
political  order,  we  are  confronting  the  ‘intolerable’ and  toleration  and intolerance  are  likewise
beside the point. If we consider instead practices, conducts, convictions, which are not violating any
right,  but  are  the object  of  moral  and social  disagreement,  this  is  the  area  where  indifference,
acquiescence, toleration, intolerance and, lastly, response to intolerance are all possible attitudes and
types of conduct. Displays of social  intolerance are often translated into political  claims for the
prohibition of the contested practice or conduct, as well as responses to intolerance usually lead to
claims for the public toleration of the practice. A horizontal issue is thus translated into a vertical
issue of toleration requiring political  settlement,  and usually the public controversy revolves on
whether  the  conduct  or  practice  that  is  the  object  of  dislike  or  disapproval  can  be  defined  as
intolerable or not. The almost exclusive focus on the intolerable, on the one hand, has induced an
excessive stretching of the notion of harm and self-defense, while, on the other, it has prevented
from seeing certain claims as intolerant. My proposal is to reverse the attention from the intolerable
back to the intolerant.
Freedom of Expression and Harm of Misrecognition
Among the controversial cases around toleration, a very thorny one concerns whether free speech
should be limited when it causes harm of misrecognition.22 I am referring to the controversy which
followed the publication  of the vignettes  on Mohammad by the Danish magazine  in 2005, and
which escalated up to the 2015 deadly attack on Charlie Hebdo. I pick this debate since its special
complexity makes it a good test for the conceptual distinctions drawn above, given the prevailing
confusion and reciprocal accusations. In most of other well-known and amply discussed cases of
toleration, such as dress code for Muslim women and mosque building, stricter limits to toleration
are demanded by sectors of the majority in order to exclude practices of the Muslim minority from
public toleration. In this long standing affair, instead, the situation seems prima facie reversed, for
the limits to toleration of free speech are claimed by Muslim representatives, on the ground of the
blasphemous offensiveness of the vignettes and of the harm done by misrecognition; but let  us
examine the controversy more closely.
The publisher, the journalists, and many people after them claimed that the publication was
an instance of free expression against bigotry and fanaticism.23 Seen in this light, the subsequent
protests of Muslim groups and the demand to censor the blasphemous publication was read as an
instance of Muslim intolerance.  The Muslims’ disapproval of the vignettes  was not withheld in
favor of toleration,  but acted upon for invoking the ban on the publication.  In this  reading, the
champions  of  toleration  were  the  journalists  and  publishers  who  personally  risked  the  Islamic
violent  reaction  for  the  sake  of  freedom  of  expression—that  is  for  the  very  embodiment  of
toleration. The unrest characterizing the protest in Muslim countries against the cartoons, the harsh
protests taking place in Europe as well, and lastly, the deadly attack on Charlie Hebdo, followed by
other terrorist outbursts, have seemingly vindicated this reading, and proved the Muslim intolerance
and its threat to liberal values and political security.
The specular reading of the affair, supported by Muslim spokespeople, but also by liberal
sectors of the majority, understood instead the publication of the cartoon as a trespassing on the
harm principle and, more specifically, on the principle of non-discrimination, toward a minority on
the basis  of their  religious  convictions.24 Intolerable,  in this  reading, was the disrespect and the
implicit  discrimination  implied  by  the  content  of  the  cartoons.  Along  this  line  of  reasoning,
toleration would have recommended not to publish the vignettes. This interpretation comprises two
different claims: a) the cartoons impaired the Muslims’ right to religious liberty for the latter implies
not only freedom from legal impediments in practicing one’s faith, but also freedom from social
harassment and demeaning of what religious believers hold sacred. b) The satire was meant not only
to criticize the expression of the Muslim faith, but also to target Muslim groups who already suffer
discrimination and marginalization in Western countries. Under this interpretation, the publication
of  the  cartoons  was  thus  intolerable  and in  two ways:  it  was  literally  a  restriction  of  Muslim
religious  liberty,  and  symbolically  undermined  their  social  standing  and  inclusion  in  Western
democracy. As we can see, the two opposed readings of the affair seem to vindicate the claim that
toleration is inextricably involved in circular accusations and has become useless as an analytical
category. Before subscribing to this conclusion, let me reframe the controversy anew with the help
of the above conceptual distinctions.
I shall start considering the issue from the viewpoint of vertical conceptions of toleration.
According to the liberal model, that is the political principle embodied in constitutional rights, equal
liberty is granted to every citizen and member of society, and that mandates freedom of expression
for all. Henceforth, toleration of dissenting opinions is no longer a discretionary act of a gracious
sovereign who withholds his or her power of suppression, as it was under the absolute monarchies
of  the seventeenth  and eighteenth  centuries,  but  that  it  has  become embodied  in  liberty  rights.
Freedom of expression implies that political authority ought not to interfere with free speech as a
rule, and ought to refrain from censoring the expression of dissenting opinions in society. Hence,
generally speaking, everyone is free to express their opinions and views: in the light of the liberal
model, the publishers were thus entitled to publish the vignettes, and the Muslims to protest against
them, as long as the protest was not violent.
Does  toleration  as  recognition  recommend  something  different?  As  said,  toleration  as
recognition aims at the equal standing and equal respect for members of minorities compared to
members of majorities. In this respect, the claim that the publication of vignettes undermines the
equal standing of Muslim people in European society, by demeaning and ridiculing their religion
and culture, is one that supporters of toleration as recognition cannot dismiss beforehand. And if
there  are  grounds  to  consider  the  publication  intolerable,  then  there  may  be  grounds  to  state
intervention, by a legal ban of the publication. This conclusion cannot however be easily drawn by
supporters  of  toleration  as  recognition,  and  for  various  reasons.  Firstly,  the  harm  done  by
misrecognition is diffuse and cannot be established in a precise way, as in case of libel. Secondly,
the harm of misrecognition should be balanced with the harm of censorship. Thirdly, a legal ban on
the  vignettes  might  have  induced  a  backlash  on  all  Muslims,  instead  of  contributing  to  their
inclusion. All in all, the option of banning the publication for the sake of the overall toleration of
Muslim religion and culture meets serious obstacles  in its way, so as to make the legal  ban ill
advised. Yet, the decision against the ban does not imply that the harm of misrecognition cannot be
addressed in a different way. If the point of toleration as recognition is the legitimization of the
public presence of a cultural and religious difference, then, even though censorship is excluded,
different  political  actions  affirming  the  symbolic  meaning  of  equal  respect  for  the  Muslim
population are usually available.25
In the circumstances of the 2005 Danish publication of the cartoons, I think that such a
political action was precisely to accept the request of the ambassadors of several Muslim countries
who  had  asked  to  discuss  the  negative  depiction  of  the  Muslim  religion  with  the  Danish
government.  Receiving  them  and  attending  to  their  grievances  would  not  have  compromised
freedom of expression, but, rather, given Muslims due consideration and would have meant to take
them seriously. By contrast, the Danish Prime Minister bluntly dismissed the ambassadors' request,
commenting to the press: “This is a matter of principle. I won’t meet with them because it is so
crystal clear what principles Danish democracy is built upon that there is no reason to do so”.26 In so
doing,  the  Prime  Minister  did  not  acknowledge that  there  was any point  in  the  claim that  the
cartoons represented an act of misrecognition for Muslim faith and culture, and showed that he did
not take their offense seriously. This kind of attitude was unfortunately present in the whole debate
and exacerbated the feelings of being misrecognized by Muslim groups.
In sum, considering both vertical conceptions of toleration there was no case for restricting
freedom of expression though for different reasons. There were principled reasons in favor of the
publication in light of the liberal conception, while, according to toleration as recognition, a balance
of reasons, partly pragmatic, partly principled, suggested the ban as ill advised.27 Nevertheless, there
was room for a more respectful approach to the Muslim request by the political  authorities,  an
approach that could have contributed to the recognition of the public presence of Muslims, while
deflating the whole issue at the same time. With few exceptions,28 most participants in the debate in
fact did not question the legal right to publish. Yet the right to publish does not imply the duty to
publish, and, in this respect, the question moved to whether the publication was wise, either for
prudential or for principled reasons. In other words, the question was whether self-restraint of the
press would have been right, wrong or simple expediency.
If political  toleration was not the issue,  the controversy must be relocated around social
toleration,  for,  in  this  case,  the  contention  concerned  intergroup  relationships  rather  than  the
political  authority  and  the  focus  was  on  the  social  fabric  and  civil  coexistence  in  pluralist
democracy. What would horizontal toleration have recommended to either side: publication or not,
protest or not? And what was ‘intolerable’ in this case, any limit put to freedom of expression or the
harm done by misrecognition? Contrary to the prevalent discussion focused on the second question,
I shall instead address the first. Instead of debating on where to draw the line of the intolerable, I
shall  approach the issue from the  point  of view of who was ‘intolerant’ socially  speaking:  the
publishers of the offensive vignettes or the protesters against the publication?
We have seen that social  toleration is the case if:  i) party  A objects  to some conduct or
practice of party B; ii) party A has the power to intervene in the disliked or disapproved conduct or
practice of party B; iii) nevertheless refrains to use such power and let B free to act and live as he or
she pleases. These three conditions hold, and toleration is the case, only if the object to tolerate falls
within the scope of the tolerable; the death threats and the subsequent terrorist attacks are clearly
intolerable, hence excluded from the scope of this analysis. Intolerance is the case if party  A, i)
objecting to party  B, and ii) having some power of intervention, iii) chooses to act on his or her
original  objection.  Before  applying  this  model  to  the  cartoons  controversy,  a  preliminary
consideration  on  power  is  in  order.  Condition  sub  ii)  is  meant  to  set  apart  toleration  from
acquiescence: if  A has no power over  B,  A’s non-interference follows from a state of necessity.
True, the lack of power does not prevent the possibility of having the disposition of being tolerant,
and in that  case,  the non-interference may be not only a necessity,  but also a choice internally
subscribed.29 The question is however how the power to interfere is defined, given that social agents
are not in the position of legally and literally obstructing others' liberty, a position that characterizes
only political authority. Social agents may have rather the power to put a burden on others’ liberty,
to make it more costly, and to stigmatize certain kinds of behavior or practices with social sanctions.
For social toleration to make sense at all, the notion of interference should be interpreted in such a
way as to include social sanctions and extra burdens on the conduct or practice that is the target of
the objection.
Back to the case. From the publishers’ standpoint, the publication of the cartoons was not
only permitted by their constitutional right to free expression, but was also morally and politically
recommended as a response to a widespread culpable timidity toward Islam and its violent threats,
since the time of the fatwa on Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. Hence, the publication of the cartoons was
not only within the scope of the tolerable, but actually a morally due reaction toward the intolerable,
namely the violence and the bigotry of Islam, and the culpable tendency of Western indulgence
toward such characteristics. Under this reading, the alleged harm of misrecognition, that is the harm
done by the satire to the religious sensibilities of Muslims was simply dismissed on the basis that, in
a liberal society, no religion and no view can claim immunity from critical scrutiny or from irony,
ridicule,  and  mockery.30 Muslim  groups  protesting  and demanding  an  apology  were  viewed  as
claiming preferential treatment over other religions and views,31 and the support Muslims got from
liberal sectors of the majority was just an instance of the process of victimization of Islam sustained
by  the  cage  of  political  correctness.  In  other  words,  the  publication  was  an  instance  of  non-
toleration of the intolerable.
This interpretation, however, is questionable. In general, it is not true that no limit to free
speech is tolerable, and no harm of misrecognition can ever override free speech. More specifically,
in this case, the point was not political censorship, but rather self-restraint in social context, which is
often dictated by the virtue of civility in social relationships.32 Moreover, this interpretation implies
the reference to a highly problematic notion of intolerable. Can the claim not to be offended in one’s
religious  convictions,  understood  as  a  claim  to  immunity  from  rational  scrutiny,  be  defined
“intolerable”? Recall that ‘intolerable’ are objects which fall outside the boundary of toleration, for
they infringe on either the self-defense or the harm principle.  Even granted that such principles
allow contested  interpretations,  still  it  is  hard to  see how the claim to immunity  from rational
scrutiny harms third party or puts the political order at risk. Such a claim may be the object of
strong disapproval, but that qualifies it precisely as an object of toleration/intolerance. The only way
in which the claim to immunity from rational scrutiny can be included into the “intolerable” is if it
is taken as a symptom of the general intolerance of Islam as a
whole. But, even conceding such interpretation, it does not follow either that only the symptom
should justifiably not to be tolerated or that Islamic doctrine is “intolerable” because it is deemed
intolerant as a whole. For, . For, on the one hand, Islam is not a monolithic doctrine, but comprises
many interpretations and persuasions, some more reasonable than others, as most religious doctrines
which  were  precisely  the  original  object  of  toleration.  On  the  other  hand,  even  dogmatic  and
illiberal doctrines are hardly “intolerable” as such: as a rule, it is the actions following from certain
doctrines  that  are  prosecuted  and the  organizations  aiming  at  such actions  that  are  banned.  In
general, even if the Muslim religion were declared “intolerant” as such (and I argue that this is
wrong),  it  would not  follow  ipso facto that  it  were considered  “intolerable”  In sum, the moral
recommendation to publish could easily be trumped by the reasons in favor of tolerant self-restraint.
According to the definition of toleration/intolerance, we can actually reverse the publishers'
interpretation, for: 1) they objected to aspects of the Muslim religion, 2) had the power to ridicule
those aspects publicly and to issue a social sanction against them, and 3) had the choice of either a)
refraining from using that power, hence embracing tolerance, or b) acting on their objection, hence
rejecting  toleration.  Publishing  the  cartoons  constituted  the  action  consequent  to  the  original
objection; hence, it was a choice against toleration by agencies endowed with social power in the
media  system targeting  a  religious  minority  in  European  society.  This  reading  has  not  been  a
prevailing  line  of  argument  in  the  controversy,  yet  it  can  provide  a  stronger  criticism  of  the
publication of the vignettes than the harm of misrecognition and, especially, it seems to me a helpful
approach  to  clarify  the  confusion  of  crisscrossed  accusations.  The  first  condition  for  the
interpretation of the vignettes as socially intolerant to stand is that the not-withheld objection of the
publishers  and  journalists  refers  to  an  object  belonging  to  the  area  of  the  ‘tolerable’ and  this
condition is satisfied, as we have seen, for the objection concerned aspects of the Muslim doctrine.
The second condition concerns the power of interference, which, as said above, must be understood
as a social power to stigmatize certain behavior. The publishers are indeed endowed with the ample
social  power of media in our society,  which in this  case is the power to ridicule  those aspects
publicly,  and  hence  to  issue  a  social  sanction  against  Muslims.  Given  the  original  and  other-
regarding objection and the power to interfere, the publishers and journalists' decision to publish
was precisely acting on the basis of their objection,  conforming to the intolerance option. What
about the Muslims’ protests then? They also acted on their objection to the publication; are they
therefore socially intolerant as well, thus taking toleration back in a vicious circle? The conceptual
distinctions  drawn  above  come  in  handy  once  again,  for  Muslims’  protests  satisfy  the  two
conditions  for  being  classified  as  response  to  intolerance,  being  a)  the  counter-objection  to  an
original objection targeting Muslims’ religion, and b) being self-regarding, in so far the protest was
directed to defend the protesters’ religion.
To sum up: from the standpoint of vertical toleration, no interference with the publication of
the vignettes was licensed according both to the liberal model and to toleration as recognition. The
latter  would  have  rather  suggested  some  public  stand  to  counter  the  sense  of  disrespect  and
misrecognition of Muslims within their hosting country. As much as the cartoons were permitted,
peaceful public protests against the vignettes also fell within the scope of vertical toleration, for
public protests are just different instantiations of freedom of expression. From the standpoint of
horizontal toleration in the social exchanges, moving the focus of the analysis from the intolerable
and the limits of toleration to the intolerance of given acts and conducts has permitted to describe
the choice of publishing the vignettes as intolerant and the following Muslims’ protests as responses
to intolerance.
Does that  imply that  the publication was wrong and that  the protests  right?  I  think that
publication was not good and that the protests, as long as peaceful, were justified. Yet, I like to
remind that  social  toleration is  a value among competing others and not a duty of justice.  The
strength of social toleration compared to other values depends on its justification: if it is justified
out of respect for other people is stronger than is justified on pragmatical grounds. In this latter case,
if the reason for the objection is moral, then pragmatical reasons for toleration may not win over the
disapproval. The publishers in fact saw self-restraint as proceeding from a compromising attitude
for peace, while their objection was phrased in terms of deontological duty; plausibly, a duty could
not be trumped by prudential considerations. Yet, publishing the vignettes was an  intolerant act,
which  according  to  the  different  understandings  of  why toleration  is  required,  may be seen as
justified  or  not.  If  toleration  is  accounted  in  terms  of  respect  for  others,  as  I  hold,  then  the
publication of the vignettes constitutes an instance of unjustified intolerance. On the other side, the
protests against the publication, as long as they were peaceful, were not intolerant, but responses to
the  intolerant  ridiculing  of  Muslim convictions.  Even in  this  case,  the  protests  may be  judged
unwise, but the conditions for defining them as responses to intolerance are all in place. In other
words,  since the judgment on whether intolerance  is  justified or not,  hence,  acceptable or bad,
depends on the reasons in favor of toleration which my previous conceptual analysis has left open,
then there might still be disagreement about whether the decision to publish the vignettes and to
protest against them was good or bad, wise or unwise. What is clear though is what toleration would
prescribe, while the circular accusations of intolerance can be brushed away.
Conclusions
Toleration has been recently attacked on different grounds: at the political level, toleration policies
have been criticized for leaving liberal democracy defenseless against Islamic invasion and Jihadist
terrorism; at the theoretical level, toleration has been questioned as to its analytical capacity in the
realm of partisan politics. I have here responded only to the theoretical criticisms as the necessary
preliminary to counter the political ones. I have thus provided a conceptual clarification, starting
with  a  discussion  of  the  inextricably  normative  nature  of  the  concept  of  toleration,  and  then
proceeding  to  the  three  main  conceptions  of  toleration,  finally  focusing  on  the  concepts  of
intolerance, intolerable and responses to intolerance. I have then taken up the skeptical criticism to
the analytic capacity of toleration, by examining an especially complex case, namely the one started
with the publication of the Danish cartoons and ended with the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo. In
this  respect,  I  have  argued that  what  vertical  toleration,  on  the  one  hand,  and what  horizontal
toleration,  on  the  other,  would  recommend  is  clear,  notwithstanding  a  persistent  reasonable
disagreement  on what it  was good or bad,  wise or unwise.  Toleration is  thus rescued from the
skeptical  position,  while  the  disagreement  concerns  rather  the  justification  of  social  toleration,
which may lead either to prioritize ethical integrity over pragmatic reasons for toleration, or to view
toleration as part of one's moral outlook on the grounds of the higher principle of respect.
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